NATIONAL TRUST AND LOCAL POLITICS :

Twenty Years of the Shiretoko National Trust Movement in Japan, 1977–1997.

Hisayoshi Mitsuda

ABSTRACT

The hallmark of public land protection in many countries of the world has been the management of rural areas by urbanites with little empathy for or faith in the conservation capabilities of rural inhabitants as management partners (Fortmann and Bruce, eds., 1988). International conservation groups are now questioning the wisdom of separating the goals of habitat protection and genetic diversity from the welfare of human communities in and near protected areas.

Many biologists, ecologists, foresters and natural resources managers have come to view an inclusive approach to local residents as an enlightened way to achieve long-term conservation (West and Brecchin, eds., 1991). Notwithstanding the spread of the inclusive perspective, many environmentalists remain skeptical about the harmony of interests thought to exist between human welfare and ecological well-being. The conservation biology movement in Japan is ambivalent about the potential role of local people in protecting the species diversity surrounding them (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981).

This study examines these problems in the context of a conservation alliance between urban environmentalists and local residents in Shiretoko National Park, on the Northern Island of Japan. To address the questions, we trace the emergence and development of the Shiretoko National Trust Movement during two relatively distinct periods focussing on an environmental opposition group against the Japan National Government until 1987, and on a powerful group in

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the local politics which was established after the victory of the environmentalist's Mayor in 1987.

1. Introduction

A recent World Bank report finds that buffer zone strategies in which local people are allowed certain extractive activities have yet to demonstrate their contribution to conservation (Wells, Brandon and Hannah, 1990). The classic debate between Pinchot and Muir on the place of humans in the larger ecological order has taken a new but in some ways familiar turn.

The present research is an inquiry into the inclusionary approach to national park conservation. It documents a conservation alliance between urban environmentalists and local residents in the Shiretoko National Park on the extreme eastern extension of Hokkaido in Northern Japan (see Figure 1). It is a case study which, on its face, would appear to be a classic case of its antithesis, that is, urban elites using their influence to impose park status on a unique rural landscape. Herein lies Shiretoko's uniqueness. Founded in 1964, it might be viewed as an early instance of Japan's predominantly urban environmental movement. Its protected status as a national park and more recently as a biosphere reserve is, however, in many ways attributable to the foresight of local as well as national visionaries. In this sense, it stands apart as a "people's park" and a useful instance of conservation that is inclusionary in nature.

In the following account, we document the evolution of this alliance process over the past quarter century. We begin by setting the legal, political and economic context of Shiretoko in which it unfolded, and then incorporate the historical record of the park, supplemented with interview information and questionnaire results gathered by the author in affected communities in the Shiretoko area. Finally, we assess the capability of local residents as full partners in national park protection and management efforts by summarizing relevant environmental attitudes and actions of this population.

2. Japan's Shiretoko National Park in Context

Though Japan's modernization and industrial development is typically traced back to the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Japan remained a largely agrarian society until the early 1950s. Unprecedented rapid economic growth ensued in the 1960s. Employment in agri-

culture and other primary industries dropped from almost 50 percent of the workforce in 1950 to about 10 percent in 1980. At the same time, employment in manufacturing grew from 22 to 35 percent and service sector employment doubled from 29 to 60 percent. This break-neck transition from an agricultural to industrial economy and beyond was accompanied by dramatic environmental deterioration, or "Kogai," and an altered standard of living which, by the 1980s, translated into a quest for wilderness recreation opportunities in unpolluted rural areas (Bennett and Levine, 1973 ; Pierce, Lovrich and Tsurutani, 1980). Thus, between 1965 and 1975, the number of Japanese using the country's national parks doubled (Mitsuda and Geisler, 1988).

Three of Japan's twenty-seven national parks are located in remote areas of Hokkaido, including Shiretoko National Park. Almost 70 percent of Hokkaido is forested, which amounts to 23 percent of the total forest in Japan and the majority of its old-growth trees. The Shiretoko Park's environmental amenities include forest and wetland ecosystems, endangered owls, eagles and cranes, wild rivers, drift-ice flows on the Sea of Okhotsk, and the wilderness charm of many Alaskan Islands. Given these and other qualities, the undeveloped regions of Hokkaido are prime candidates for preservation and use by Japan's growing conservation/recreation interests.

The legislative context surrounding Shiretoko National Park dates back to the founding of Japan's National Parks Association (whose members included leading men of letters and business) in the 1920s and to the country's first national park law in 1931. Gradually, over the ensuring 60-year period, urban elites redesigned rural landscapes to suit their recreational and aesthetic interests. At times this thrust has had to accommodate prior uses of the land, both public and private. This means that multiple uses are permitted in the parks of Japan, including logging, farming, advertising, tourism, aquaculture and a limited amount of construction-multiple uses that led to significant conflicts in Shiretoko National Park in the 1980s.

Foremost among these economic uses was logging. Its presence has at times strained relationships between the Japan Forest Agency, owner of Japan's National Forests (many of which overlap extensively with National Parks) and the Ministry of Public Welfare, which administers National Parks. The Forest Agency reserves the right to cut timber from all it lands, and typically does so on a rotating basis. The frequency and intensity of these rotations are driven by its commitment to local employment generation by maintaining parity between domestic timber production and what is imported from abroad. Recent lack of such parity has put pressure on the Forest Agency to increase its

cut in National Forests in Hokkaido and elsewhere.

A final matter of context fundamental to an understanding of the Shiretoko case is the changing power base of political parties as a function of Japan's Green Power Movement, both locally and nationally. As will be seen momentarily, environmental politics led to the ouster of an experienced local mayor in the Shiretoko area, both a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the same mayor who played a principal role in the Park's establishment in 1964. Ironically, this mayor lost his job to a Socialist because environmentalists believed the latter candidate would resist old growth cutting and other perceived abuses of the park. This turn of events is, a microcosm of national environmental politics which ultimately will dictate the inclusionary nature of Japan's conservation policies. Both the LDP and the Socialist Party are viewed by Japan's new generation of environmentalists as traditional and irrelevant to the new concerns of green party candidates and platforms.

To summarize, the unusual nature of the Shiretoko National Park is not an accident on the one hand nor a common occurrence on the other. Even if one argues, as we do at the end of this paper, that the Shiretoko experience can be repeated in other rural prefectures, it is important to comprehend something of Japan's conservation laws, its economic transition to a post-industrial society, and the interaction of conservation politics occurring locally and nationally.

The story of how the Shiretoko National Park evolved into a partnership (local/non-local) approach to conservation is best told in four episodes. The first spans the post-war years and culminates in 1964 when local inhabitants of the Shiretoko Peninsula successfully sought the park's designation. Following this comes a period of local agitation for park expansion, leading to the establishment of the "Shiretoko National Trust" in 1978. It is a historically unique moment of partnership between local environmentalists and their urban counterparts.

From 1981 to 1986 this partnership was overshadowed and even jeopardized by contentions between development and environmental interests at the national level. The final chapter in the Shiretoko story is unfolding today, with the recent declaration of Shiretoko as a biosphere reserve and the renewal of the earlier partnership. The success of this reserve is closely linked to the success of this partnership. If an inclusionary approach to conservation is followed, local people will have a meaningful voice in activities permitted in the reserve's buffer and transition zones shielding core (park) zone from environmentally destructive behaviors.

3. The Coming of the Park

By the second decade of this century, following Japan's successful war against Russia,



Figure 1 : Hokkaido and Shiretoko Region

Japanese colonists had arrived in the Shiretoko region from the northern areas of Honshu, the main island. Despite severe winters, mountainous terrain, and short growing seasons (yearly average temperature is under 9℃), these settlers attempted to cultivate plots cleared within the virgin forest. Contact between the mainland culture and that of the local Ainu was amicable. This may have contributed to the reverence settlers held for the region's unusual endowment of natural beauty.

After the opening of a national highway, called as "the Sky-Way" in 1957 between the peninsula communities of Shari and Utoro. Local inhabitants mobilized to create the Shiretoko National Park. Local inhabitants in the former town formed a Tourist Association and extolled the region's wilderess beauty. By late 1964, the new park encompassed 39.731 hectares. This was also a period of agricultural decline and hardship. Twenty four local households abandoned their lands in 1966 and moved to Shari town on the northen border of the park the following year (see Figure 1). Nonetheless, some 300 households retained land within the park boundary, posing potential management conflicts from a strict conservation standpoint. From the end of World War II to the mid-1970s,the protection of Shiretoko was, with the exception of the National Park status granted by the national govemment, a grass-roots affair. Shari-town residents formally requested in 1973 that the Hokkaido Prefectural govemment enact more restrictive logging rules in the Park and thereafter passed a local "constitution" declaring it the responsibility of the Town to protect Shiretoko National Park. Finally, in 1975, eight farmers requested Shari town to purchase their lands totaling 112 hectares and add these to the park. Lacking funds for such matters, the town appealed to the Environment Agency for financial assistance. This request was turned down.

4. The Diffusion of the Trust Concept

This situation changed rapidly in 1977, in the wake of an opinion column appearing in Japan's leading national newspaper, *Asahi Shinbun*, on Britain's National Trust for Places of Historic Interest and Natural Beauty. It was explained therein that common citizens in England successfully support conservation projects through private gifts and donations. With over a million members, it is the country's largest voluntary organization and its largest private landowner (Lowe and Goyder, 1983). Within a month of reading about the National Trust Movement in Britain, Shari town's mayor announced plans to inaugurate a Shiretoko National Trust eligible to receive donations for the purchase of



A. Shari Town formalizes the Shiretoko National Trust concept (Jan., 1978)
B. Ashahi Newspaper editorializes in favor of a Shiretoko National Trust (Jan., 1979)
C. Forest Agency releases 4 th. Plan (March, 1981)
D. Japan Nat'l. Trust forms in Tokyo (Feb., 1983)
E. Forest Agency's 5 th. Plan made public (Nov., 1985)
F. Forest Agency cuts 530 old-growth trees (April, 1987)
G. Mayor Gorai takes office (May, 1987)
H. Shari branch of Forest Agency closes (March, 1988)
I. Shiretoko National Park gains Biosphere Reserve Status (Dec., 1988)

Figure 2: Number of Shiretoko National Trust Members, 1977-1989

Shiretoko lands that would otherwise go to developers. These lands were divided into mini-plots of 100 square meters (costing roughly 8,000 yen or $80 US) so that donor/buyers of all economic means could purchase at least one plot.

The results of this appeal were remarkable. Within four months 10 million yen were donated (US $1 00,000), a figure that climbed to nearly 50 million yen by 1979 (See Figure 2). Inholder lands in the Shiretoko Park were thereby purchased and converted to Shiretoko National Trust Lands. By 1980, the Trust owns 380 hectares assembled from thousands of small purchases and similar trusts have appeared throughout the county following the Shiretoko example. Even with the editorial backing of major newspapers, celebrities and a massive membership in urban areas, however, the Shiretoko National Trust met with problems in the early 1980s that challenged its local autonomy to the core.

5. The Partnership Jeopardized

In 1981, unforeseen by all except those paying close attention to the rotational schedule of the Japan Forest Agency from one national park to another, that Agency released its "Fourth Plan" for developing and managing timber resources on 11,000 hectares of a proposed cutting site within the Shiretoko National Park. Though clear cutting was not mentioned, what the Plan meant by "selective cutting" was the clear cutting (including old growth) on 21 percent of the cutting site and newly built roads and loading facilities to service the cutting sites. The Mayor of Shari town instantly expressed objections to the Plan and a local grass-roots movement (the "Group to Protect Blue Oceans and Green Lands") sprouted overnight. The District Office of the Forest Agency in Kitami City, Hokkaido (about 100 kilometers west of the park), announced thereafter that the Fourth Plan was being suspended.

Only in 1982 did it become clear that, with the Fifth Anniversary of the 100 Square Meter Movement, the future of the Shiretoko Park had shifted from local to national interest groups. Notably, the National Trust, heretofore consisting of myriad regional offices, established a central headquarters in Tokyo and organized an All-Japan National Trust Conference in that City in 1983. Increasingly, university professors. jounalists and novelists spoke on behalf of Shiretoko Park protection and called for a revised Forest Plan for the peninsula in the name of local people. It was in response to this plan that national environmentalists and Forest Agency officials locked horns, thereby preempting the leading role of local people.

What followed is subject to several interpretations. In 1985 the Forest Agency made public a new "Fifth Plan," the key aspects of which are comparable to the Fourth Plan. Basic to understanding the Agency' s insistence on logging the region is the fact that its national budget derives from cutting revenues. The Hokkaido Region Forestry Planning Committe endorsed the new plan, as did the Environment Agency. Then, following a meeting between the Mayor of Shari town and the Director of the Agency,the mayor himself gave his qualified support on the basis that helicopter removal would replace the road system of extraction proposed in the previous plan. The Shiretoko National Trust supported the mayor and mailed a written defense of this support to National Trust members throughout Japan.

It might appear that the local-national coalition was still intact at this time. Hokkaido

environmentalists were outraged, however, and threatened to withdraw their former donations from the Shiretoko National Trust if cutting occurred within the park. Japan's eminent novelist, Mr. Masanori Hata, used his column in the *Asahi Shinbun* to ask the Japanese public to demonstrate against the Fifth Plan and personally sued the head of the Forest Agency for contributing to environmental deterioration. The indigenous Ainu in Shiretoko held religious ceremonies in honor of the forest spirits and protests against forest destruction sentiments that finally led to Ainu spokesmen to publicize their position at the United Nations. By mid-summer, the polarization seemed irreversible. National television and press tended to take a strong position against cutting whereas loggers from local, regional and national associations supported the latest plan. National environmental groups sent members to Shiretoko to mount a "picket encampment" on lands owned by the National Trust while their leaders traveled to Tokyo to ask the Forest and Environment Agencies to suspend tree cutting in the disputed area. One day before the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Japan National Trust in Tokyo, these ministers agreed to a half-year freeze on cutting and to a scientific survey of logging advisability in the region. Within a week of this announcement, picket encampments on the boundaries of the Shiretoko Park were removed.

The next six months echoed with protests and public statements by pro-harvest groups and more tempered statements by foresters that limited cutting was acceptable economic as well as environmental behavior. By mid-April, 1987, the Forest Agency completed its research and announced plans to harvest 530 of the 844 originally identified old growth trees. Environmentalists made their most dramatic move to date by tying themselves to old growth Shiretoko trees, the so-called "CHIPCO" movement modeled after its namesake in India.

6. Local Environmental Credibility Restored

The execution of the Fifth Plan, facilitated by an army of police called upon by the Forest Agency director, all but ended the autonomous action of the local residents of Shiretoko. National organizations,agencies and personalities seemed to control local destiny. Shiretoko citizens,initially responsible for the Park, and the success of the National Trust Movement locally as well as nationally, were now divided over the cutting issue and lacked credibility vis-a-vis their former environmental allies at the national level. This condition changed abruptly in 1987, however, in whatthe *Asahi Shinbun* headlined

as an "Unexpected Victory for People's Green Power."

The occasion was the 1987 mayoral election, held the same month the Fifth Plan was executed. Therein, the pro-harvest incumbent was narrowly defeated by Mr. Sakae Gorai, the local head of the Shiretoko Environmental Association, and peace was restored to the environmental ranks throughout the county. Within his first year, the new mayor negotiated a termination not only of the Shiretoko cutting but of the Agency's regional office in the Shiretoko region. The Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, whose ministry contains the Forest Agency in a fashion similar to the United States, stated publicly that the time had come for his Ministry to work closely with local leadership.

In 1988, the Director General of the Japan Forest Agency formed a special committee on Foresty and Environmental Protection, which included a representative of the Japan Nature Conservancy. The committee issued is report in December, 1988, after six months of study. The Director deneral accepted the report and decided to stop all cutting of old growth trees in Shiretoko National Park. In the same report, a proposal for a Man and the Biosphere Reserve in Shiretoko was discussed. In other words, the struggle over permitted land uses within Shiretoko National Park had pervasive effects on the Forest Agency, resulting in less emphasis on clear-cutting of forests and more concern with preservation there and in all other national parks in the country. In 1989, the Agency established twelve biosphere reserves on pre-existing national forests/national parks with the near-full support of environmental groups throughout the country.

7. Local Environmental Attitudes

The historical record of the last several decades strongly suggests that local people in the Shiretoko Park area deserve the confidence of natural resource managers as reliable custodians of their unusual environment. They secured national park status for their area, expanded it through the Shiretoko National Trust, and passed resolutions, ordinances and even a "constitution" to further the protection of its environmental amenities. Finally, when their principal elected official wavered on the difficult issue of tree harvesting, they elected a new leader against considerable odds.

Such behavior is all the more remarkable when we examine the background of the local people. Based on questionnaire results sent to all residents in the commnunity of Utoro, we found that only 14 percent had college degrees or more. This contrasts with 38 percent for Japan as a whole. Moreover, 34 percent of the Utoro inhabitants made their



Figure 3 : Twelve-Year Trend in Tourist Activity in Shari Town, 1975-1987
Source : Report on Tourism in Shari Town(1987)

living directly from the primary sector (fishing, logging or farming) compared with 8 percent for the entire county. These are not the educational nor occupational backgrounds that lead one to predict sustained environmental activism (Mohai, 1985 : 821). A plausible explanation for the apparent environmentalism among Shiretoko residents might be theirself interests in expanding tourism. As shown in Figure 3, the number of tourists between 1975 and 1987 rose dramatically in the Sharetoko area. Moreover, national park designation in Japan has frequently meant the extension of scenic highways and infrastructure in remote areas, something local interests might desire. But the problem of poorly distributed tourism benefits is well known and rarely enriches a cross-section of local people. Most of the tourism increase in Figure 3 consists of day-trips which benefit mainland tour corporations arranging buses in and out of the region and have few local employment or revenue multipliers.

Local residents could well have had other motivations for their environmentalism. We asked Utoro residents a series of environmental questions in 1987 which had been posed

in Japanese national opinion polls in 1986. When asked about the extent of their concern for protecting nature, more local residents expressed concern than was the case nationally and 33 percent of the former said they were extremely concerned in contrast to only 20 percent of the general public. Among local residents, 58 percent expressed protection (versus development) sentiments compared with 60 percent nationally. As for methods to accomplish this protection, locals exceeded the general public in their support for public ownership of land (30 and 23 percent, respectively) and environmental education (34 and 25 percent). Local Utoro residents were comparable to citizens throughout Japan when asked about present (28 and 26 percent) and future (68 and 69 percent) environmental participation. Finally, sentiments regarding the National Trust Movement as a way of protecting national assets tended to be more guarded for both local and national respondents and reveal that a higher proportion of the former contribute to the Trust (28 percent) than do the latter (22 percent).

8. Instrumentalization of the movement

Instrumental environmentalism becomes prevalent among the contemporary Japanese environmental groups. Early environmentalism in Japan was the "intrinsic/pure environmentalism" supported by the grass roots people in order to protect the bio-physical environment at the community and local level. However, contemporary environmentalism shifts towards the "instrumental environmentalism" employed for political ends among the movement's leaders in order to gain the political power and leverage in environmental controversies. "Is environmentalism an ultimate end or an instrumental goal ?" will be a crucial question for all environmentalists.

As mentioned above, the Shiretoko National Movement fought against police guards on April 14, 1987, in order to stop to cutting old-growth trees in Shiretoko National Park. A large number of urban environmentalists jumped into this movement for a few years around 1987. However, after the environmentalist mayor rose and the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry declared a ban on cutting in the park in 1987, most of urban environmentalists withdrew gradually from the movement. The enthusiasm for protecting Shiretoko's wilderness faded away in the big cities such as Tokyo and Osaka. Almost no movement members lived in the cities were ever concerned with the rural poverty in the protected area of the Shiretoko Park at all.

Of course, as a high percentage of the general populace is still concerned with environ-



Figure 4 : Total Number of Shiretoko National Trust Members, 1977–1997

mental issues and supports environmentalism in Japan. The size of the organization of Shiretoko National Trust has steadily been increasing from 28305 in 1987 to 49024 in March, 1997 (Figure 4). The total amount of donations from all around Japan to the organization has exceeded 520,052,000 Yen (Approximately 5.2 million US$) on March 24, 1997, which is enough to buy all the sites of 472 hectare that were to be protected at the starting point of the movement. It looked as if the goal of movement was accomplished concerning with the protection of imperiled park.

However, this green dream does not come true in Shiretoko by now. Mr. Gorai, the Mayor of Shari Town, who was a founder of Shiretoko National Trust Movement established in 1977, was recently sued twice, at least, in the local and Sapporo City courts by the green groups, because he destroyed the natural environment by using the movement's fund as the source of revenue to develop tourism, for example by building the Shiretoko Nature Center featuring a huge tourists' amusement in 1989 and by expanding the road into the protected area. Many original members,worked togather with Mr. Mayor, criticized him for converting his initial spirit as an environmentalist.

In the words of former leaders of the movement :

> *"People have cultivated a big 'green pie' in the Shiretoko National Park, but some movement leaders ate it in the process of 'Intrumentalization of Environmentalism'."* (Interviewed with Mr. Takeshi Honda, former owners of Shiretoko Youth Hostel at Utoro, March 31, 1977)

> *"Mr. Gorai has sold his "green-soul" to the industrial villains,"* (Mr. Kanji Katurada,

the owner of National Inn of of Shireto, on March 29, 1997).

In October 1990, "the Group of Indigenous Shiretoko" started with the Anti-Mayor movement for stopping his cut of natural forest adjacent to the Trust Movement sites. The mayor decided to construct the parking lot (approximately 6,300 square meter) for the visitors of Shiretoko Nature Center in the town-owned land. Many members sent messages criticizing the Mayor's behaviors against the Trust Movement and some declared off their donation. The leader of new group, Mr. Katurada went to Japan Environmental Agency in Tokyo on November 15, 1990 and asked the Agency to forbid the illegal cut without the Agency's permission in the National Park. Surprisingly, the Agency supported the mayor's explanation that the parking lot needs to control the affluence of tourists' cars and illegal parkings in the Park. Finally, one of the movement members in Sapporo brought an accusation of the illegal cut against the mayor on October 21, 1991.

In addition, the mayor was rumored to get a lot of dark money from developers and constructors outside of the town. Many claim that he repaid all his debts of 30 million Yen (Approximalely 300,000 US dollars), by which he bought farm lands near the protected area a long time ago, during his first term as a mayor. In his second term, he made a lot of efforts to construct many public buildings in his town, such as a community center, a cultural museum, Public Apartments, as well as private hotels and gift-shops. Shiretoko became a boom town for tourism as its name became popular among all the Japanese. Still more developments resulted in falling deeper into the 'expansion of production' near the protected area. It is very common in rural Japan that developers and constructors allow a commission of as much as 10 to 20 percent of all expenditures to a few political leaders and mayors. Mr. Gorai might have gotten and tasted the sweet gifts from them. Finally he wanted and succeeded in maintaining control of his town during a third term. Therefore, he will be in power for twelve years. He invited his own men in the town office and made good partnerships with the big national, general constructors as well as with local builders in and near Shiretoko. He did and still does try to exclude opposition groups such as the pure environmentalists in his town while involving his industrial partners who wants to share the pie of economic development during the terms of his mayership.

One good example is that, during Gorai's second term, the director of the general affairs in the town office secretly advised his sister who lives in Tokyo to buy a large plot of wilderness land belonging to the national government lying near the protected area.

The price of the national land was very low at two or three thousands Yen per 100 square meter. The director's sister bought the very site where the town office would build a parking lot for the Shiretoko Nature Center a few years after the buying took place. The town government bought the site back at more than ten times the initial price, by using the Shiretoko Trust fund coming mostly from donations for the movement. It is not clear why the environmental NGO could not check its own trust fund. At the beginning stage of the movement, when it mainly consisted of the local groups, the leaders and the local town made the exclusive contract that the local government could manage the fund always without any outside checking by the movement's members. After the movement grew larger, it still entrusted its management to the local government to maintain the wilderness area in the park because most of new members live in the main island far from Shiretoko, not being easily able to visit there.

None except top leaders in local politics knew this scandal in Shiretoko. This is the reason why the land-sale information was limited to only a few politicians of the town office. Nobody in the town knew the family name of the director's sister, since she changed her family name after her marriage in Tokyo. As a result, the sister and her clever brother gained the profits behind the political wall. This is only a example of how Mr. Gorai manipulated his men and controlled the town by using a profits-inducement method.

In sum, the early environmentalism in Shiretoko was as "intrinsic environmentalism" supported by the grass roots people from allover Japan in order to protect the fragile bio-diversity and ecosystem in this remote peninsula. However, the movement inclines toward becoming more institutionalized in the process of developing and sustaining in its organization, in opposition to the power of national governments. In particular, after the victory against the Forest Agency and the withdrawal of urban environmentalists, the movement shifts towards a phase of "instrumental environmentalism" employed for political and economical ends among the movement's leaders and participants in order to gain power, affluence, fame, and leverage in environmental controversies in Shiretoko.

9. Conclusion

A growing number of environmentalists are persuaded that the successful protection of imperiled parks entails the protection and assistance of imperiled local people. The case study we have presented lends support to this perspective using two data sources, one

historical and the other background information and survey responses from local inhabitants. Particularly instructive in the case study is the role of the National Trust in coupling the interests of local and national environmental interests in a mutually beneficial fashion. In contrast to the National Trust of England, its distant parent, Japan's National Trust has empowered Shiretoko residents to participate in the planning and protection of a national park in their midst.

At issue is whether the National Trust will continue to facilitate such collaboration or abandon the social needs of local members and communities surrounding protected areas, an issue the Trust will surely face in the future. Although the National Trust, as it has operated in the Shiretoko case, illustrates a parallel to inclusionary zoning, inclusion occurs at the pleasure of urban elites, central planners and professional resource managers and bureaucrats. It can, at any time in the future, be rescinded. More to the point, the power equation over land use planning has changed by degree rather than kind and could revert to its former, exclusionary pattern. The centralized British model has its own potential pitfalls. If copied blindly, the Japan National Trust would by statute become a highly centralized and powerful organization. The British Trust has advocated expanding that country's national park system and indeed owns 7.5 percent of Britain's park lands. So strong is its political appeal that, though private, several sources of public revenue are channeled to it and it has the legal right, granted to no other private landowner, of appealing to Parliament to override any threatening eminent domain decisions made by public bodies. Control over general policy, finance, property acquisition, and appointments to regional committees of the Trust would rest, as in the English case, with its central executive committee. Within this centralized structure there would be little room for the ordinary Trust members to Shiretoko level to participate in policy making and priority setting.

Other operating models for the Japan National Trust suggest themselves. Bearing in mind the origins of National Trust organization. This might eventually lead to a series of formal partnerships between a central National Trust and regional counterparts in each prefecture. Such partnerships would hasten the sharing of funds for land acquisition and power sharing on key policies, appointments, and strategies for opening the organizational doors to local member participation.

More specially, Japan's National Trust movement could offer leadership in inclusionary (people-oriented) conservation in Japan. For example, rather than focusing exclusively on the purchase of lands valuable for biodiversity, the Trust could adopt the principle of

integrated conservation and regional development and tailor local environmental education efforts to this dual purpose. Just as the Trust seeks funds to buy lands of ecosystem value, it could appeal for donations for social and economic welfare near conservation zones in the belief that social and biological restoration go hand-in-hand. Thus, in addition to buying 380 hectors of environmentally significant land near Shiretoko National Park, National Trust members could support land purchases for economic development in the context of an integrated local land use plan.

In this article, we are suggesting that national trusts are, based on the Shiretoko case, a potential institutional infrastructure for inclusionary conservation. The trust model, if decentralized, can achieve the equal protection of parks and people through a joint effort by local and nonlocal people. The protected status of areas such as Shiretoko National Park and Biosphere Reserve is only as permanent as the commitment by environmentalists to this integrative approach.

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